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Summary
The objective of this paper is to briefly present the disaster assessment methodologies, 
mainly emergency situation ones, available and used in the subregion and to compare them with the 
disaster assessment methodology developed by the Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC), which has a more pronounced post-disaster, long-term focus and has been 
perfected by its use for more than two decades in several countries in the region. This comparison is 
exemplified by the presentation of the results of two recent ECLAC missions to hurricane-stricken 
countries in the subregion during which this methodology was used.
Introduction
As we know, the Caribbean is a disaster-prone area 1/. Yearly, the so-called “hurricane 
season” systematically wreaks havoc in the subregion, most notably among the countries of its outer 
Atlantic arch, causing heavy damages in human and economic terms, disrupting economic activities, 
destroying the existing infrastructures, exerting a heavy toll in terms of human lives. Additionally, 
other types of natural disasters, most notably the recent series of volcanic eruptions in Montserrat, 
also happen in the subregion. Therefore, a disaster-related structure must be seen as indispensable in 
the subregion.
17 Estimates made by ECLAC indicate that in an average year natural disasters in Latin America and the
Caribbean cause material and production losses valued at more than US$1,500 million as well as more than 
6,000 deaths. See Jovel, R., Natural Disasters and Their Economic and Social Impact, CEPAL Review, n° 
38, Santiago, Chile, 1989. In 1995 the number of losses due to natural disasters surpassed US$1,100 million 
in two islands in the subregion, with no official casualties. See ECLAC, “The M acro-Econom ic E ffec ts and  
R econstruction  R equ irem en ts Following H urricane Luis in th e  Island o f Anguilla", LC/MEX/L.289, 
LC/CAR/L.462, 1995 and “The M acro-Econom ic E ffec ts and  R econstruction  R equ irem en ts  
Following H urricanes Luis and  Marilyn in S in t M aarten, N etherlands Antilles", LC/MEX/L.290, 
LC/CAR/L.463, 1995.
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Reflecting these needs, the Caribbean already has a relatively sophisticated regional disaster- 
management structure in place, the so-called “Regional Response Mechanism” (RRM)1/, that 
embraces all the National Disaster Coordinators (NDCs) of its member countries, the Eastern 
Caribbean Donor Disaster Coordination Group 1/ (chaired by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), Barbados), the Caribbean Disaster Relief Unit (CDRU) and the Caribbean 
Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA) whose participating States include BVI, Barbados, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts/Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and 
Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos. This regional mechanism also has ties with a 
set of international agencies and organizations that work in the subregion with a traditional or 
institutional role in this area (among others, the UNDP, the Office of the United Nations Disaster
2/ In the Caribbean Basin, as a whole, several disaster-related agencies and systems actually
coexist. The non-independent territories usually have their National Disaster Coordinators (NDCs) 
linked to the respective agencies in their mother countries (like the USA’s FEMA) and Central 
America has a joint organization that is part of the Central American Integration System, the Centro 
de Coordinación para La Prevención de Desastres Naturales en América Central (CEPREDENAC), 
with headquarters in Panama and national commissions in each member country.
3/ Members, by category, are as follows: Chairman - UNDP; Response agencies - CDERA, RSS
(Regional Security System); Support agencies - IDB (Inter-American Development Bank), OAS 
(Organization of American States); Donors - BDD (British Development Division), CDB (Caribbean 
Development Bank), CIDA, EU, PAHO, UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund), USAID; Local response 
agencies - BARMET (Barbados Meteorological Office), BDF (Barbados Defense Force), CERO (Central 
Emergency Relief Organization); Joint disaster response agencies - FAO (United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organization), ITU (International Telecommunications Union), UNCHS (United Nations Centre 
for Human Settlements), UNV (United Nations Volunteers), WFP (World Food Programme).
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Relief Coordinator (UNDRO), Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), International Federation 
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRCS), U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 
(USAID/OFDA), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the European Union (EU) 
and the United Kingdom’s overseas development agency, the BDD.
The subregional agency inside the Regional Response Mechanism responsible for the 
disaster-assessment procedures is CDERA. The Barbados-based CDERA uses a disaster assessment 
methodology 1/ based on that of UNDRO.1/.
4/ See UNDP/UNDRO, Disaster M anagement M anual. Actually the UNDRO was one of the
organizations involved in the creation of the CDERA and RRM structures, through the Pan Caribbean 
Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Project (PCDPPP) in the early 1980s, and it still participates in regional 
disaster-related efforts and organisms.
5/ See UNDRO, Disaster Prevention and M itigation: A Compendium o f Current Knowledge, New York,
1979.
UNDRO’s disaster-assessment methodology is a traditional, mostly “static” one. Its main 
concern lies in assessing the damage immediately caused by the natural disaster, since its first 
objective is to establish the needs for immediate emergency measures to save and sustain the lives o f  
survivors. In other words, it is mainly a phase-one - em ergency  - methodology. Assessment of this 
type provides the necessary information support for emergency decision makers, a specific user or 
group of users who are making decisions about emergency resource-allocation in what is usually a 
fast-changing and stressful environment, in the immediate post-disaster phase. Identifying the losses 
and possibilities for facilitating the long-term recovery and development needs is perhaps 
understandably considered only as a secondary priority in this kind of situation 1/.
Usually in underdeveloped countries the loss of life and limb is considerably greater than the 
losses in terms of capital and infrastructure, contrary to what happens in developed countries. This is 
due to the greater degree of capital accumulation and the existence of a previous warning and 
disaster-management structure in the latter. The Caribbean, in this respect, has a pattern that 




warning and disaster-management structures both at nationall/ and regional!/ levels described above 
and, partly as a result of this, the economic losses are usually greater than the human casualties!/.
ECLAC’s Methodology
ECLAC’s disaster-assessment methodology 1/, on the other hand, has a more post-disaster 
focus, trying to identify basically the long-term social and, especially, economic effects of a natural 
disaster. In other words, its main concerns lie in phase two - rehabilitation and recuperation, also 
called transition - and phase three - reconstruction  - of the post-disaster situation 1/.
7/ As an example of the high level of preparedness in some more developed Caribbean countries, see 
NEMA (National Emergency Management Agency) - the NDC for the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago - 
national plan for disaster situations (See NEMA, 1996 (a)).
8/ Including regional disaster-resistant construction codes for some of the regional groupings, like that 
of the OECS - one of the outcomes of a joint UNDP/UNCHS/OECS project - (See NEMA, 1996 (b)) and 
CARICOM’s Caribbean Uniform Building Code (See NEMA/CARICOM, 1996).
9/ Also the type of natural disaster that affects most of the region contributes to this - disasters of a 
meteorological nature cause less victims on average that those of a geological nature.
M/ See ECLAC, M anual Para la Estimación de Los Efectos Socioeconómicos de Los Desastres 
Naturales, Santiago, Chile, 1991.
XL/ It must be noted that this is actually more of a difference in the intensity of the focus of these 
different analytical approaches. UNDRO (See UNDRO, ibidem , and UNDP/UNDRO, ibidem ) works 
clearly recognize the importance of the indirect and secondary costs and effects of disasters, and
6
ECLAC’s methodology itself is based in some methodological and conceptual breakthroughs from 
UNDRO’s works in the late 1970s (See UNDRO, ibidem ).
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ECLAC’s procedure has, in this respect, some major advantages, notably its attempt to 
evaluate the economic losses not only in the usual static manner, namely, assessing the destroyed 
and lost infrastructures, but also in a dynamic and sectoral perspective, that is, calculating future 
losses derived by the destruction of productive structure and forfeitures of business opportunities 
and its middle/long-term effects in terms of growth rate, employment figures, inflation level, trade 
and fiscal balances. It should be added that the importance of these secondary and indirect effects is 
usually greater in developing countries, due to the fact that these countries have comparatively fewer 
available resources than developed countries to bring their economies back to its previous growth 
path.
An additional important feature of this methodology is that it also aims to enable its users to 
try to define i f  and which type o f  international cooperation the country affected may need. A precise 
knowledge of the sectoral damages and losses, present and future, suffered by the countries, enables 
its government to make a more precise targeting of the reconstruction projects and a more adequate 
eventual negotiation with the international donor community.
A definition of direct, indirect and secondary effects will make the methodological 
differences of the approaches clear:
- Direct effects: They include all types of assets and stocks affected or destroyed 
immediately by the disaster, including crops, adding the costs of cleaning and demolition of the 
affected areas (since this is considered a necessary direct cost to the resumption of activities) 1/;
- Indirect effects: They refer basically to the flows of goods and services, on a sectoral 
basis, that fail to be produced from the period after the disaster due to reasons imputable to it, 
including things like the increased transportation costs incurred by the firms to the destruction of the 
transportation network, the taxes that fail to be collected by the government due to the reduced level 
of economic activity, etc.
- Secondary effects: They represent the effects of the disaster on the behaviour of the 
main macroeconomic variables in the middle to long run (i.e., between two and five years), like the
_  Even though it is recognized that the value of lost assets is less than their replacement cost, the latter 
is a truer measure of the manner in which the national economy will be affected as a result of the 
reconstruction programme to be undertaken. Replacement also includes some elements of improved 
technology for some items, such as higher-quality specifications for low-cost housing.
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gross domestic product - total and sectoral -, the current and capital accounts, the public finances, 
the investment and interest rates, the price and employment levels. To make such comparisons, 
previous baseline scenarios for the economy must, of course, be available.
Direct and indirect effects can be aggregated, and together they give a real picture of the 
losses and damages attributable to any given disaster. The same cannot be done with the figures for 
secondary effects, since they can be considered as the side-effects of the two first categories in the 
economic structure, in the short to long term. They can also be understood as an appreciation of the 
direct and indirect effects from another - macroeconomic, long-term - point of view.
The realization of such calculations is only feasible upon the availability of data, which 
indicates that this evaluation should be made shortly after the disaster, once the emergency phase p er  
se  is already over but when its effects are still clear, since a disaster situation usually puts such a 
level of pressure on a country’s government that not much time is left to deal with questions of data 
availability. This is specially true if the administrative capital of a country was itself affected by the 
disaster.
An example
As a practical demonstration of the quantitative importance of middle/long-term indirect and 
secondary effects when compared to the short-term direct effects, we will present the cases of 
Anguilla and Sint Maarten. Both Anguilla and Sint Maarten were heavily affected by the 1995 
hurricane season - the most active in the subregion in registered history. At the request of the 
respective governments, ECLAC carried out evaluation missions in late 1995 in both countries. The 




SUMMARY OF DAMAGES AND LOSSES CAUSED BY HURRICANE LUIS IN ANGUILLA
(Thousands o f US Dollars)
Sector and subsector
Estimated damages and losses
Insurance 
recovery * /Total Direct Indirect
Total for island 55,321 45,522 9,799 21,507
Social sectors 8,402 8,295 107
Housing 7,571 7,571 -
Health 308 218 90
Education 523 506 17
Infrastructure 13,422 9,827 3,595 2,342
Water Supply 41 41 -
Electricity 3,426 1,817 1,609 987
Ports and airport 1,465 1,285 180 373
Communications 6,540 4,775 1,765 982
Roads 1,950 1,950
Production and services 33, 094 26,997 6,097 19,165
Agriculture/livestock 1,719 747 972 75
Fishery 1,260 775 485 30
Industry 165 125 40 50
Commerce 500 300 200 10
Tourism 29,450 25,050 4,400 19,000
Other sectors 403 403 -
Sports & recreation 138 138 -
Churches 265 265 -
* / When available.
Source: ECLAC.
Table 2 
SUMMARY OF DAMAGES AND LOSSES CAUSED BY HURRICANES
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LUIS AND MARILYN IN SINT MAARTEN
(Millions of US Dollars)
Estimated damages and losses Insurance
Sector and subsector Total Direct Indirect reimbursement */
Total 1,070.4 571.1 469.3 409.3
Social sectors 216.3 197.2 19.1 22.0
Housing 192.3 179.8 12.5
Education 15.6 13.3 2.3
Health 8.3 4.1 4.2
Basic services 61.7 33.2 28.5 12.0
Water supply and energy 14.8 5.9 8.9
Telecommunications 37.7 20.1 17.5
Cable television 7.6 5.6 2.0
Postal services 1.6 1.6
Infrastructure 26.5 14.1 12.4 99
Airport 9.2 1.3 7.9
Ports 15.4 10.9 4.5
Roads 1.9 1.9
Productive sectors 762.6 353.3 409.3 363.9
Commerce 271.5 79.0 192.5
Tourism 490.7 274.1 216.6
Other sectors 0.4 0.2 0.2
Other damages 33 33 15
* / When available
Source: ECLAC.
As is evident, the indirect damages were not only very substantial in both cases (18 per cent 
of the total damages in Anguilla and 44 per cent in Sint Maarten, and 54 per cent of the losses for the 
productive sectors in the latter island), but in the case of Sint Maarten they were almost as 
substantial as the direct ones.
In terms of secondary effects, the tables on the following pages provide the forecasted 
consequences for GDP growth and tax revenues for both countries:
Table 3
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EFFECTS OF THE DISASTER ON ANGUILLA GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
(Thousands o f US Dollars)
Projections for 1995
1994 Without disaster After the disaster
Gross domestic product 
(factor cost, constant prices) 58,474 60,251 51,620
Agriculture 2,464 2,254 1,630
Fisheries 1,626 1,351 1,026
Manufacturing 445 461 421
Mining and quarrying 351 344 344
Construction 6,785 6,785 8,142
W holesale and retail 3,585 3,743 3,585
Hotels and restaurants 21,570 24,413 19,530
Electricity and water 1,404 1,350 1,080
Transport 3,509 4,074 3,258
Communications 5,732 6,724 5,379
Banks and insurance 5,777 6,524 5,220
Real estate and housing 2,174 2,228 2,005
Government services 7,709 8,102 9,722
Other services 898 925 185
Less, imputed service charge -5,555 -7,104 -6,100
Source: ECLAC, based on available information and on its own projections.
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ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF THE HURRICANE ON ANGUILLA GOVERNMENT FINANCES
(Thousands o f US Dollars)
Table 4
Projections for 1995
1994 Without disaster After the disaster
OVERALL BALANCE -2,521 -970 -13,170
Current balance 1,287 162 -11,775
Current revenue 15,808 16,969 17,633
Tax revenue 10,653 10,900 10,957
On property 49 123 37
On domestic goods/services 2,332 2,681 1,993
Accommodation tax 1,849 2,264 1,572
Bank deposit levy 355 302 297
Other 128 115 124
On international trade and transactions 8,272 8,096 8,927
Import duty 6,921 6,604 7,595
Foreign exchange tax 475 566 532
Embarkation tax 604 642 544
Other 272 284 256
Non-tax revenue 5,155 6,069 6,676
Current expenditure 14,521 16,807 18,488
Capital expenditure 3,808 1,132 1,358
Source: ECLAC.
As is evident, the disaster lowered the country’s GDP by almost 12 per cent when compared 
to 1994 figures (i.e., back to its 1991 level), with effects also on the projected GDP for 1996. The 
government deficit worsened by more than 1,350 per cent when compared to its 1995 previous 
projected value. Negative effects due to the disaster on the external sector (overall balance) and on 
employment figures were also forecasted.
Table 5 
EFFECTS OF THE DISASTER ON GDP OF ST MAARTEN 
AND THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES









National gross domestic product (factor, cost, constant 
prices) 1,863.4 2,129.2 2,073.5
Sint Maarten
Sint Maarten GDP 335.7 464.1 408.3
Agriculture, fishing and mining 1.2 1.6 1.5
Manufacturing 8.9 12.2 11.8
Electricity, gas and water 13.1 17.8 15.7
Construction 27.5 37.3 34.3
Wholesale and retail trade 109.9 141.8 131.7
Hotels and restaurants 43.9 63.2 50.5
Transport, storage and communications 51.9 74.6 64.5
Finance and other business services 59.1 85.0 74.0
Social and personal services (including Government 
services) 39.4 56.7 46.2
Less, imputed bank charges -19.2 -26.1 -21.9
Source: ECLAC, based on available information and on its own projections.
Table 6
ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF THE HURRICANE ON 
SINT MAARTEN GOVERNMENT FINANCES







Total taxes 62.20 62.80 47.99 68.67
Profit tax 13.46 12.07 10.97 13.71
W age tax 36.22 32.91 26.32 35.65
Income tax 4.62 6.58 3.95 7.13
Other taxes 7.90 11.25 6.75 12.19
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Source: ECLAC, based on available information and on its own projections.
The impact of the disaster was very substantial: Sint Maarten’s GDP fell almost 14 per cent 
from its previously forecasted 1995 value, affecting not only the island itself but also the whole 
economy of the Netherlands Antilles (of which Sint Maarten represents 20 per cent), both in 1995 
and also during the following year. The island’s government revenues fell almost 25 per cent. 
Negative effects in the external sector, somewhat mitigated by capital inflows linked to the 
reconstruction efforts and insurance payments, and in unemployment rates are also expected.
Based on the previous estimations, an indicative list of reconstruction projects was also 
elaborated and supplied to the respective countries’ governments in question.
Conclusion
The non-estimation of the middle/long-term indirect and secondary effects of natural 
disasters may grossly misrepresent the extension of the damages inflicted by these disasters. A more 
adequate and representative assessment of these economic losses must, therefore, take into 
consideration also the indirect and secondary effects. A clear picture of these other types of effects 
also helps the affected country in the process of deciding if international cooperation is necessary for 
the reconstruction of its economy, and, if so, in which areas and under which conditions it should 
happen. Such evaluation makes the contact with international cooperation institutions easier. Those 
elements are what ECLAC’s disaster assessment methodology strives to provide.
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